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DEVELOPMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE
VOTING AGE
Katharine Silbaugh*
ABSTRACT

Several municipalities have lowered the voting age to 16, with
similar bills pending in state legislatures and one considered by
Congress. Meanwhile, advocates for youth are trying to raise the ages
of majority across an array of areas of law, including ages for
diverting criminal conduct into the juvenile justice system (18 to 21);
buying tobacco (18 to 21); driving (16 to 18); and obtaining support
from the foster care system (18 to 21). Child welfare advocates are
fighting the harms of Adultification, meaning the projection of adult
capacities, responsibilities, and consequences onto minors. In legal
and social history, seeing 16- and 17-year-olds as possessing adult
capacities has connected with holding them responsible for adult
decision-making, particularly in the criminal justice system, but also in
disciplinary mechanisms at school. This effect is dramatically worse
for children of color. These two movements are in tension; child
welfare advocates are fighting Adultification while democracy
advocates are fighting for younger entry into the adult political
sphere. But the age of majority is not a technicality. It is a thick
fabric of public and private laws formed for the protection of children
and adolescents, an interwoven safety net, whose efficacy depends on
the strength of the weave. Indeed, the age of majority plays a
protective role in our 18-year-old voting age; the 16-year-old
franchise exposes youth to constitutionally protected campaigning,
inviting commercial and political interests to target teenagers with
“political speech.” Currently, public law shields teenagers from this
contact for fear they will be exploited, and private law enables
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parents to constrict campaign interactions with teenagers. Countless
similar underappreciated harms of Adultification can carelessly
deprive children of educational, housing, employment, and civic
futures. The minor extant intrusions on the age of majority, such as
the driving age, pale in comparison to the civic meaning of lowering
the age of the franchise. When the voting age dropped from 21 to 18,
states lowered their legal age of majority from 21 to 18 in response,
influencing policies such as aging out of foster care and entitlement to
child support beyond 18. As a core marker of citizenship, voting has
had a powerful anchoring effect on ideas about civic maturity.
Lowering the benchmark for civic maturity threatens to anchor a
lower age for civic protection, as occurred when the 26th Amendment
passed. This Article contends that 16- to 18-year-olds are entitled to
their childhoods, as Greta Thunberg contends, with our protection
and support, not to the burdens of adult hopes, adult expectations,
adult uses, and adult consequences.
It makes a claim for
developmental justice grounded in participatory democracy.
Lowering the voting age works at cross-purposes to the essential task
of protecting youth from premature engagement with the criminal
justice system, and with the long-term disenfranchisement that can
come with that entanglement.
With Adultification risking
criminalization and criminalization risking disenfranchisement,
current thinking about youth voting exposes disparities in public
ambition for the future political participation of youth arising from
the disparities in their childhood experiences.
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II. The Right to Protection from Campaigning ...................................284
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“This is all wrong. I shouldn’t be up here. I should be back in
school on the other side of the ocean. Yet you all come to us young
people for hope? How dare you. You have stolen my dreams and my
childhood with your empty words.”
- 16-year-old Greta Thunberg, 2019 UN Climate Action Summit,
September 20191

INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPMENT, POSITIVE RIGHTS, AND TEEN
VOTING
On March 7, 2019, Representative Ayanna Pressley went to the
floor of Congress to introduce legislation to lower the voting age
nationally from 18 to 16, saying, “[f]rom gun violence, to immigration
reform, to climate change, to the future of work — our young people
are organizing, mobilizing and calling us to action. They are at the
forefront of social and legislative movements and have earned
inclusion in our democracy.”2 Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi,
the most powerful legislator in the United States, favors lowering the
voting age to 16, and she supported a local ballot initiative in the 2016
election in San Francisco that would have given 16-year-olds the right
to vote in local elections.3 In 2019, 125 members of Congress
supported such a move at the federal level. With the help of the
advocacy organization Vote16usa.org,4 a movement has begun to
lower the voting age to 16, with bills pending in a number of state

1. Greta Thunberg: You Are Failing Us. How Dare You, CNN (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/videos/health/2019/09/23/greta-thunberg-powerful-ungaclimate-change-speech-sot-vpx.cnn [https://perma.cc/3X7N-FVXM].
2. Press Release, Representative Ayanna Pressley, Rep. Pressley’s Floor
Remarks
on
Lowering
the
Voting
Age
(Mar.
7,
2019),
https://pressley.house.gov/media/press-releases/rep-pressleys-floor-remarks-loweringvoting-age [https://perma.cc/3SAX-SPYL].
3. John Bowden, Pelosi Says She Backs Lowering Voting Age to 16, HILL (Mar.
14,
2019),
https://thehill.com/homenews/house/434115-pelosi-says-she-backslowering-voting-age-to-16 [https://perma.cc/RCK9-JHMV].
4. See generally VOTE16 USA, http://vote16usa.org/ [https://perma.cc/WSN3H3BC] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
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legislatures aimed at aspects of that goal.5 Recently, these ideas have
motivated successful efforts to lower the voting age to 16 in several
cities and towns, and the introduction of the Bill in the current
Congress to do so for federal elections.6 The movement is premised,
in part, on the notion that neuroscience and our improved knowledge
of development indicate that for voting, 16-year-olds have sufficient
cognitive development.7 This Article will examine the movement to
lower the voting age through the lens of developmental equality,
contending that neuroscience and youth activism are not the only
metrics for understanding the laws protecting youth.
State conceptions of 16-year-olds have another consequence.
Nationwide, over 800,000 juveniles were arrested in 2017.8 While the
number of juvenile arrests has declined from over 2 million as

5. State Legislatures Consider Vote16, VOTE16 USA, https://vote16usa.org/statelegislatures-consider-vote16/ [https://perma.cc/QCV3-PHJ6] (last visited Jan. 10,
2020).
6. In two Maryland towns, Takoma Park and Hyattsville, for example, 16-yearolds now enjoy the right to vote in municipal elections. See Lindsay A. Powers,
Takoma Park Grants 16-year-olds Right to Vote, WASH. POST (May 14, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/takoma-park-grants-16-year-olds-right-tovote/2013/05/14/b27c52c4-bccd-11e2-89c9-3be8095fe767_story.html
[https://perma.cc/Z8HX-9MM7]; Kara Voght, There’s a Growing Movement to Let
16-year-olds Vote. It Would Change Everything, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/04/theres-a-growing-movement-to-let-16year-olds-vote-it-would-change-everything
[https://perma.cc/5EBY-HSYZ].
Berkeley, California is close to completing the same reform, and the entire state of
California may soon become the first in the nation to lower its voting age. See
Measure Y1 Passes to Lower Voting Age for School Board Elections, VOTE16 USA,
https://vote16usa.org/project/berkeley-ca [https://perma.cc/PK82-FVRC] (last visited
Jan. 10, 2020); see also Tyler Okeke & Luis Sanchez, California Is Taking Steps to
Lower The Voting Age — Here’s Why, TEEN VOGUE (Aug. 28, 2019),
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/california-bill-lower-voting-age-17-passes-assembly
[https://perma.cc/48WN-WHJG]. See generally Yamiche Alcindor, Campaign to
Lower Voting Age to 16 in Local Races Ignites a Debate, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 9, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/us/politics/campaign-to-lower-voting-age-to-16in-local-races-ignites-a-debate.html [https://perma.cc/B674-L6MB]; Nik DeCostaKlipa, Ayanna Pressley is Introducing Legislation to Lower the Federal Voting Age,
BOSTON.COM
(Mar.
6,
2019),
https://www.boston.com/news/politics/2019/03/06/ayanna-pressley-voting-age-16
[https://perma.cc/H8PL-LM9X].
7. See, e.g., Vivian Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion, Cognitive Development,
and the Age of Electoral Majority, 77 BROOK L. REV. 1447, 1513 (2012).
8. Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Estimated Number of
DEP’T
JUST.,
Juvenile
Arrests,
2017, U.S.
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/qa05101.asp?qaDate=2017
[https://perma.cc/6J4S-WZK5] (last visited Jan. 12, 2020); see also Office of Juvenile
Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Arrest Trends by Offense, Age, and Gender, U.S.
DEP’T
JUST.,
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/ucr_trend.asp?table_in=1
[https://perma.cc/FEC2-3KY9] (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).
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recently as 2007, the racial disparity in juvenile justice involvement is
increasing.9 The District of Columbia, where Pressley gave her
speech, continues to have among the highest rates of youth in the
physical custody of the juvenile justice system.10 The involvement of
those youth in the juvenile justice system dramatically increases the
odds that they will develop an adult criminal record,11 which will
undermine their futures as voters, and in seeking employment,
housing, and education.12 Just next door in Virginia, 22% of the
African American population continues to be disenfranchised due to
past felony convictions.13 Approximately 6.1 million Americans
cannot vote because of felony disenfranchisement,14 and
approximately 12 million Americans between the ages of 16 and 18
cannot vote due to age.15
This Article contends that 16- to 18-year-olds are entitled to their
childhoods, as Greta Thunberg contends, with our protection and
support, not to the burdens of adult hopes, adult expectations, and
adult consequences. They are not to be used. When we see 16-yearolds, we should see their capacity, but we should focus on their need
for protection and developmental support. In legal and social history,
the overall impact of seeing 16- and 17-year-olds as possessing adult
capacities connects with a tendency to hold them responsible for adult
decision-making, particularly in the criminal justice system, but also in

9. Id.; Joshua Rovner, Racial Disparities in Youth Commitments and Arrests,
SENTENCING PROJECT (Apr. 1, 2016) [https://perma.cc/B674-L6MB].
Data,
SENTENCING
PROJECT,
10. State-By-State
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/racial-disparities-in-youthcommitments-and-arrests/ [https://perma.cc/VK2B-SXHY] (last visited Jan. 11, 2020).
11. FACT SHEET: Reducing Recidivism for Justice-Involved Youth, U.S. DEP’T
EDUC. (Dec. 2, 2012), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/fact-sheet-reducingrecidivism-justice-involved-youth [https://perma.cc/WQJ8-P9XM]; see also Reducing
COUNCIL
ST.
GOVS.
JUST.
CTR.,
Juvenile
Recidivism,
https://csgjusticecenter.org/youth/reducing-juvenile-recidivism/
[https://perma.cc/68CV-7G7L].
12. See Sarah Berson, Beyond the Sentence — Understanding Collateral
Consequences, U.S.
DEP’T
JUST.,
OFF.
JUST.
PROGRAMS,
https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/beyond-sentence-understanding-collateralconsequences [https://perma.cc/6Z8H-C4YS].
13. State-By-State Data, supra note 10.
14. Jean Chung, Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer, SENTENCING PROJECT
(June
27,
2019),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/felonydisenfranchisement-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/4TYV-7AT4].
15. Child Population by Age Group in the United States, KIDS COUNT DATA
CTR., https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/101-child-population-by-age-group
[https://perma.cc/3NL5-KU8V] (last visited Jan. 11, 2020).
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disciplinary mechanisms at school.16 That tendency is dramatically
worse for children of color.17 Advocates for youth are trying to raise
the age for diverting criminal conduct into the juvenile justice system
from 18 to 21, a movement aimed at extending civic protection to
childhood and reversing the serious harms of Adultification.18 To be
a minor is to have a protective status, conceptually rich and legally
significant.
These movements are in tension; child welfare advocates are
fighting Adultification while democracy advocates are fighting for a
lower age to enter the adult political sphere. That tension cannot be
minimized with assurances about the genuinely good intentions of the
Vote16 movement. This Article juxtaposes the movement to lower
the voting age to 16 based in part on neuroscience with the
contrasting grooming of many 16-year-olds via the juvenile justice
system to lose the franchise for long portions of their lives. Through
that juxtaposition, this Article considers a claim for developmental
justice for children and youth grounded in participatory democracy.
Lowering the voting age works at cross-purposes to the essential task
of protecting youth from premature engagement with the criminal
justice system, and with the long-term disenfranchisement that comes
with that entanglement. Adultification is shown to lead to lessening
of social and civic support for teenagers,19 and this Article argues that

16. Phillip Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: The Consequences of
Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 501, 526–45
(2014). See generally REBECCA EPSTEIN ET AL., GEO. UNIV. LAW CTR., CTR. ON

POVERTY & INEQUALITY, GIRLHOOD INTERRUPTED: THE ERASURE OF BLACK GIRLS
CHILDHOOD
(2017),
https://endadultificationbias.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/girlhood-interrupted.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NXR-Q8HQ].
17. See generally JAMILIA BLAKE & REBECCA EPSTEIN, GEO. UNIV. LAW CTR.,
CTR. ON POVERTY & INEQUALITY, LISTENING TO BLACK WOMEN AND GIRLS: LIVED
EXPERIENCES
OF
ADULTIFICATION
BIAS
1–2
(2017),
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/poverty-inequality-center/wpcontent/uploads/sites/14/2019/05/Listening-to-Black-Women-and-Girls.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B9DW-XC63]; EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16.
18. See John Kelley, In Another Big Year for “Raise The Age” Laws, One State
Now Considers All Teens as Juveniles, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (June 25, 2018),
https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/youth-services-insider/juvenile-justice-raise-theage-vermont-missouri-state-legislation/31430 [https://perma.cc/9FFM-Z3J3]; Teresa
Wiltz, How ‘Raise The Age’ Laws Might Reduce Recidivism, PEW CHARITABLE
TRS.
(May
31,
2017),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2017/05/31/how-raise-the-age-laws-might-reduce-recidivism
[https://perma.cc/3JC2-E6K9]; see also Aidan Ryan, Crime Bill Would Redefine
Juveniles
as
Up
to
Age
21,
BOS.
GLOBE
(July
9,
2019),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/07/09/crime-bill-would-redefine-juvenilesage/maHshbBT6QaaX9ooVDVidN/story.html [https://perma.cc/KR8S-TZUX].
19. See generally Blake & Epstein, supra note 17; Goff et al., supra note 16.
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the political significance of voting carries with it a particularly potent
threat of worsening those processes.
In their urgent drive to improve political engagement, democracy
activists should pause to consider the value of the age of majority.
The age of majority is neither arbitrary nor technical. The age of
majority is a system, a thick fabric of public and private laws formed
for the protection of children and adolescents. Dismissing the
significance of the age of majority belies the function and importance
of that legal system. It is too clever to deploy imperfections and
irregularities in that fabric to argue that the age of majority lacks
content. As long as its protections are meaningful, every intrusion
requires substantial consideration not simply of the capacity of
children, which is the focus of Vote16’s campaign, but of the
protective function of legal childhood. The public and private body
of law surrounding minors forms an interwoven safety net, whose
efficacy depends on the strength of the weave. The impact of minor
intrusions on the notion of adulthood, such as driving at age 16, pale
in comparison to the civic significance of lowering the age of the
franchise.
This web of public and private law defining legal childhood often
protects in ways we fail to notice. As just one example, the age of
majority is playing a protective function in the case of the current
voting age. Political speech, including campaign speech, enjoys the
greatest protection in our constitutional and democratic system. With
the franchise comes exposure to campaign speech. Vote16 invites the
targeting of teenagers by corporate and political interests with
“political speech” from which we have typically attempted to protect
them.20 Tobacco companies, the military, credit card companies, and
all manner of commercial interests are currently regulated in their
ability to communicate with minors, in part because minors are
deemed too vulnerable to exploitation.21 But all of these entities have
urgent political interests that inform political campaigns, and enjoy
protected rights to communicate with voters. I have seen nothing in
the Vote16 movement that contends with this legal conflict.

20. For example, military recruiters may not speak to children until the turn 18
without parental permission; cigarette companies may not market to teens; teenagers
may be blocked by parents from gun advocacy websites; credit card companies may
not induce teens to borrow. See infra Section IV.
21. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, ADVERTISING TO KIDS AND THE FTC: A
REGULATORY RETROSPECTIVE THAT ADVISES THE PRESENT
(2004),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/advertising-kidsand-ftc-regulatory-retrospective-advises-present/040802adstokids.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JHC7-A7GV].
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Restriction on targeting youth is but one example of the sometimes
invisible protective function of legal childhood, a protective function
that is remarkably absent from the Vote16 discourse. Vote16
advocates will eventually be forced to address this particular issue as
campaigners conflict with state regulation on communicating with
minors and as parents exercise their right to limit campaign contact
with their 16-year-old children. When they do, will it open up for
them broader questions about the general harms of Adultification,
and the risks that their movement will lower the anchor for countless
other protections associated with legal minority?
In Reimagining Equality: A New Deal for Children of Color,22
Nancy Dowd makes a case for a new legal concept: developmental
equality. The claim is this: African American boys, and all children,
are entitled to conditions that will allow for adequate development.
Dowd explains that “[d]evelopmental equality identifies the structural
components of inequality created and sustained by the state that
generate hierarchies among children.”23 She marshals neuroscience
and new understandings of trauma and adverse childhood
experiences to focus our attention on the developmental injustices
suffered by African American children due to three factors in
particular — poverty, poor treatment in school, and excessive
involvement with the juvenile justice system, each of which engages
state action. Dowd powerfully melds conceptions about development
from neuroscience with social structures: “[a] strong surrounding
environment provides the basis for the best development of brain
architecture: because the brain is developing at a fast rate, the rate of
development and the nature of development depend on experiences,
and on interactions and relationships with others.”24
Often,
discussion of cognitive development and maturity in law is relatively
detached from the context and experiences that shape development,
so they miss the normative social, economic, and educational
circumstances that problematize narratives about “typical”
development. Dowd’s focus on environment and resources liberates
the language of neuroscience from the risks that it will draw us inward
toward examining psychological states as though they are endogenous
rather than a product of resources and state action that are highly
relevant to any discussion of equality or justice.

22. NANCY E. DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY: A NEW DEAL FOR CHILDREN OF
COLOR (2018).
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id. at 104–05.
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Dowd recognizes that she is making a case for positive rights,
though claims for positive rights have been difficult in our federal
system, even for children.25 Dowd asks us to revisit fundamental
ideas about rights more broadly, but she also grounds the claim for
positive rights to development more narrowly in childhood
exceptionalism.26
Social inequality during childhood impacts
development and life course, even as developmentally disadvantaged
groups show resilience in generating coping mechanisms in response
to trauma, poverty, violence, and inequality.27 Dowd contends that
the unequal developmental opportunities children experience result
from state action, and the developmental equality model provides a
focus on those state actions.
Once policy-created childhood
hierarchies influence children’s development, adult equality becomes
more difficult to achieve.
Dowd argues that “[u]ndermining
development
generates
potentially
lifelong
subordinating
consequences that are difficult or impossible to overcome.”28 Who
we are emerges in part from the conditions we experienced during
development, long before we have the capacities to steer ourselves
through the decision-making of the hypothesized adult in a liberal
democracy. Dowd claims a positive right to development within our
constitutional system, and mines aspects of constitutional law to call
forth these positive rights to developmental equality. This Article
presses the case for developmental justice in the context of the
franchise. It argues that conceptions of youth and the franchise
expose vast disparities in public ambition for the future political
participation of youth and children arising out of vast disparities in
developmental experiences.
Lowering the voting age based on an idealized version of
development risks Adultification: the projection of adult
responsibilities associated with adult rights, at a time when children
need our continued, formal support, from government, community,
neighborhood, and family. The fight for justice in the provision of
that support, and against dramatically unequal childhoods, requires

25. Even in the context of children, the Supreme Court has refused to recognize
any positive rights to state support or protection under the federal Constitution. See,
e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (no
constitutional right to protection from child abuse); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (no constitutional right to a public education).
Children do enjoy positive rights to education under all state constitutions. See
generally infra Section III.
26. See DOWD, supra note 22, at 80, 130.
27. Id. at 32–41, 61–65.
28. Id. at 3–4.
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viewing 16- and 17-year-olds as children for purposes of our public
obligation to them. Without diminishing the power and presence
many youths of this age possess, it is a mistake to carve out this single
aspect of their capacity from the more important context, which is the
fight for truly enabling and protecting development provided on an
equal basis. Speaking of teenagers as actualized near-adults, when
the state is assaulting their cognitive, social, emotional, and civic
development by processing so many of them through the juvenile
justice system and school disciplinary processes, threatens to lead us
away from focusing on their needs, and our own civic obligation to
meet those needs.
The Parkland students, who energized a national conversation
about reform of gun laws, serve as the normative basis for the
movement to lower the voting age, the central example of
contemporary student political voice.29 At the same time, they may
exemplify the relatively privileged ideas of child development that
trouble Dowd, despite the conscious inclusion efforts made by the
Parkland leaders.30 If development is a dynamic process rather than a
decontextualized one, and if cognitive development is shaped in part
by disparate state action rather than universalized, then we need to
acknowledge a politics to development as we speak about the
franchise.
When considering voting rights, the image of the Parkland students
must expand in light of excessive and discriminatory involvement of
African American teenagers with the juvenile justice system.
Because so many states, formally or functionally, permanently
disenfranchise citizens with a felony record, excessive teen
involvement in the juvenile justice system begs consideration of the
29. See, e.g., Voght, supra note 6; see also Susan Jones, Democrats Point to
Student Gun-Control Activists As a Reason to Lower Voting Age to 16, CNS NEWS
(Mar.
6,
2019,
7:57
AM),
https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/susanjones/democrats-point-student-gun-control-activists-reason-lower-voting-age-16
[https://perma.cc/7C93-4NXT].
30. See DOWD, supra note 22, at 65. Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, the
site of the Parkland, Florida school shooting, is a majority white school but is more
diverse than the typical American high school. The recognizable leaders of the
movement spawned by the shooting appear to be predominantly white, with the
exception of Emma Gonzales. See Sarah Ruiz-Grossman, Black Parkland Students
Want Peers to ‘Share the Mic’, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/black-students-marjory-stoneman-march-forour-lives-gun-violence-movement_n_5ac5548ce4b056a8f59810f9
[https://perma.cc/F62K-NK9U];School Directory Information for Marjory Stoneman
NAT’L
CTR.
FOR
EDUC.
STAT.,
Douglas
High
School,
https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/schoolsearch/school_detail.asp?Search=1&ID=120018002721
[https://perma.cc/MG57-EE7W] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
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impact on political participation. While new legal reform efforts
focus on enhancing the political voice of predominantly white
teenagers by enfranchising them, African American youth are
targeted by the juvenile justice system, which places them at far
greater likelihood of funneling into the adult criminal justice system.31
That, in turn, leads to their long-term disenfranchisement. Therefore,
many Black teenagers are now in the process of becoming
permanently disenfranchised, just as more advantaged teenagers are
being offered the franchise at age 16, as the world takes note of their
political voice. This is particularly distressing because a powerful
argument for positive rights to equal development could be that
developmental justice is a necessary foundation to meaningful
citizenship — citizenship best exemplified by the vote — just as
eighteenth-century leaders argued of education. Before we think
about enfranchising teenagers, we must think about protecting all
teenagers from long-term disenfranchisement; otherwise, we risk
exacerbating developmental and political inequality. A central
commitment of protecting teenagers includes a steadfast defense of
legal childhood as against the harmful encroachments of
Adultification at school, in the juvenile justice system, in the
commercial system, and even in the political arena.
Part I of this Article explores the voting age debate, focusing on
the modes of argument made in support of the 26th Amendment to
lower the voting age from 21 to 18, and their correlates in today’s
movement to lower the voting age from 18 to 16. Part I considers the
movement to lower the voting age in light of the protective goals of
the developmental justice lens. Part II of this Article considers the
protective function disenfranchisement plays for 16- to 18-year-olds,
as families and governments often shield those teens from political
speech by commercial or other organized interests. Part III explores
the intellectual history of a case for public education rooted in
popular sovereignty and extends that reasoning to a positive right of
developmental justice. A political theory of negative rights depends
in part on the democratic ideal of a government built and run by the
people. This popular sovereignty, in turn, depends upon an able
citizenry. The argument for state interest in preparing adults to selfgovern fueled a movement toward public schooling in the eighteenth
century, realized more fully for white children in the nineteenth
century. Noah Webster wrote in 1787:

31. See DOWD, supra note 22, at 48.
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In despotic governments, the people should have little or no
education, except what tends to inspire them with a servile fear.
Information is fatal to despotism . . . . The constitutions are
republican and the laws of education are monarchical. The former
extend civil rights to every honest industrious man; the latter
deprive a large proportion of the citizens of a most valuable
privilege. In our American republics where governments are in the
hands of the people, knowledge should be universally diffused by
means of public schools. Of such consequence is it to society that
the people who make laws should be well informed that I conceive
no Legislature can be justified in neglecting proper establishments
for this purpose.32

By the time we are old enough to function as citizens,
developmental injustice has changed who we become based in part on
the way race frames childhood. In this regard, we have failed the
founders’ “republican” conception of readiness before children reach
the voting age. Part IV sets out the case that voting is itself a positive
right, enabling of negative rights in much the way public education
enables voting.
Part V considers Dowd’s case for developmental equality through
the lens of the franchise, and grounds developmental justice in
positive rights. Discussion of lowering the voting age must contend
with the disparate paths toward and away from citizenship for
developmentally advantaged teens and those experiencing
developmental injustice. The decontextualized neuroscience on
which the voting argument rests obscures the state action which fuels
developmental inequality. The Article concludes that lowering the
benchmark for civic maturity threatens to anchor a lower age for civic
protection, as it did when the 26th Amendment passed. That price is
too high for too many youths in need of a more protective lens on
teen years.
I. THE VOTING AGE DEBATE
In part to improve lifelong political participation and to recognize
the stake youth have in political choices,33 in recent years a handful of
countries, including Austria, Brazil, Argentina, Croatia, Malta, and
32. NOAH WEBSTER, On the Education of Youth in America, in A
GRAMMATICAL INSTITUTE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
3
(1783),
http://americainclass.org/sources/makingrevolution/independence/text3/websterameri
canidentity.pdf [https://perma.cc/EE3R-WD4Z].
33. See Should 16-Year-Olds Be Given the Vote?, DEBATING EUR. (June 9,
2019),
https://www.debatingeurope.eu/2019/07/18/16-year-olds-givenvote/#.XW7AoChKiUk [https://perma.cc/DBH9-TQ9Y].
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Scotland have lowered the voting age to 16.34 In the United States,
several local jurisdictions have lowered the voting age for municipal
elections, including Takoma Park, Maryland, and Berkeley,
California.35 Representative Ayanna Pressley (D-MA) introduced
legislation in Congress this term to lower the voting age to 16, and
Nancy Pelosi has embraced the concept in principle.36 At this
moment in time, 16- to 18-year-olds are perceived to be more likely to
vote for Democrats than Republicans, and therefore the Democrats
may have a self-interest in pursuing a lower voting age.37 Yet, in
recent years the conservative movement has been actively engaged in
promoting conservatism to high school students through its
conservative youth organization, Turning Point USA,38 and many
arguments for lowering the voting age bear no relationship to political
party.
This Part considers those less-partisan arguments to
understand what ideas about age and citizenship fuel voting age
policy. What is the political economy of this movement, its rhetoric,
and underlying theory?
Evaluation of the rhetoric surrounding the voting age suggests that
it has not been possible to contain the meaning of the voting age to its

34. See id.; Argentina Voting Age Lowered From 18 to 16, BBC NEWS (Nov. 1,
2012),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20164573
[https://perma.cc/9N39-Q6KE]; Sharon Omondi, Legal Voting Age By Country,
WORLDATLAS (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/legal-voting-ageby-country.html [https://perma.cc/YX3H-PFEL]; Johannes Pleschberger, What Does
Voting at 16 Change? The Case of Austria, EURONEWS (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://www.euronews.com/2018/09/11/what-does-voting-at-16-change-the-case-ofaustria [https://perma.cc/8WTS-DZYU].
35. See Joshua Douglas, The Right to Vote Under Local Law, 85 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1039, 1052–61 (2017); Benjamin Oosterhoff, Should 16 and 17-Year-Olds Be
PSYCHOL.
TODAY
(Oct.
14,
2018),
Able
to
Vote?,
https://www.psychologytoday.com/ca/blog/civically-engaged/201810/should-16-and17-year-olds-be-able-vote [https://perma.cc/FZW6-ZLKF].
36. See Bowden, supra note 3; DeCosta-Klipa, supra note 6.
37. See Emily Badger & Claire Cain Miller, How the Trump Era Is Molding the
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
1,
2019),
Next
Generation
of
Voters,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/upshot/trump-era-molding-young-voters.html
[https://perma.cc/5D5T-PJEJ]; Valerie Richardson, States Race Ahead of 2020
Democrats in Push to Scrap Electoral College, Lower Voting Age, WASH. TIMES
(Mar.
27,
2019),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/mar/27/2020democrats-proposed-electoral-college-voting-a/ [https://perma.cc/VK38-WLBS].
38. See Andrew Marantz, The Parkland Provocateur Kyle Kashuv Prepares to
NEW
YORKER
(June
3,
2019),
Graduate,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/06/03/the-parkland-provocateur-kylekashuv-prepares-to-graduate [https://perma.cc/W8Y7-5NFG]; Alexandra YoonHendricks, A Place Where Conservative Teenagers Feel Free to be Themselves, N.Y.
TIMES (July 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/us/politics/turning-pointyoung-conservatives.html [https://perma.cc/3H25-G4HU].
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own lane. Instead, as one of the primary markers of citizenship, the
voting age has a powerful anchoring effect on ideas about civic
maturity, regardless of intentions. Indeed, advocates for raising the
age of juvenile court jurisdiction cite directly to the other legal
benchmarks of adulthood, starting with voting:
You have to be 18 to vote in a general election or join the military
without your parents’ consent — and you’ve got to be 21 before you
can belly up to the bar.
But in some states, if you’re under 18 and you break the law, you’ll
be treated as an adult, no matter how slight the crime — even if it’s
just jumping a subway turnstile or shoplifting.
Sixteen-year-olds in New York and North Carolina are still funneled
through adult criminal courts and housed in adult prisons and jails.
In Georgia, Michigan, Missouri, Texas and Wisconsin, 17-year-olds
are automatically prosecuted as adults.
Raising the age can have a huge impact on the lives of young people.
Teens funneled into adult prisons do not have access to
rehabilitative services that the juvenile justice system provides. And
adult prisons can be extremely dangerous for teens.
Prosecuting minors as adults used to be more common. But the
practice has declined amid increasing awareness that young people,
with brains that are still developing, may not fully understand the
consequences of their actions, as well as evidence that teens are
more likely to commit additional crimes if they are prosecuted as
adults.39

Advocates of a 16-year-old voting age need to take seriously the
possibility of unintended consequences for 16-year-olds beyond the
vote itself. At the time the voting age dropped from 21 to 18, most
states still called 21 the age of majority.40 Once the voting age moved
down to 18, states lowered their legal age of majority to 18 in
response,41 which influences policies such as aging out of foster care
at 18,42 and entitlement to child support beyond 18.43 This Part seeks

39. Wiltz, supra note 18.
40. See The 26th Amendment, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/unitedstates-constitution/the-26th-amendment [https://perma.cc/MJD9-2YDJ] (last visited
Jan. 13, 2020).
41. See Termination of Child Support Age of Majority, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES
(May
6,
2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/humanservices/termination-of-child-support-age-of-majority.aspx [https://perma.cc/G6D5DED3].
42. See Time for Reform: Aging out and on Their Own, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND.
(May 28, 2007), https://www.aecf.org/resources/time-for-reform-aging-out-and-ontheir-own/ [https://perma.cc/S4S2-AMGS].
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to surface the dynamic between voting age arguments and
conceptions of the need to protect youth.
The following Section considers the kinds of arguments that appear
in the debate, looking for theories of childhood, democracy,
citizenship, and development that are deployed in the discussions, in
order to anchor developmental equality in political history and
discourse.
A. The Civic Elevation of the Age 18
It is not difficult to identify the cause of the 18-year-old voting age,
especially since cause does not need full coherence. There was a
single over-arching mode of argument that was persuasive in lowering
the voting age to 18, and that mode of argument compared the age of
military service to the age of voting. In 1942, President Franklin
Roosevelt led a successful effort to lower the age for conscription into
the armed services to 18, and a consensus quickly developed that
voting should accompany involuntary service.44 The effort to lower
the voting age began as soon as the conscription age changed, with
serious proposals to pass a constitutional amendment lowering the
voting age as early as 1944.45 The Vietnam War propelled that
consensus into action.46 In 1971, the 26th Amendment to the
Constitution was ratified, setting the voting age at 18, where it had
previously been 21.47 The causal explanation for the 18-year voting
age, then, is the tethering of voting age to the age for military service:
“old enough to fight, old enough to vote” was the rallying cry of the
26th Amendment movement.48 Put differently, the cause for the 18year-old voting age is that the age for military service was lowered to
18. The voting age did not advance in its own right but in relation to

43. See Termination of Child Support Age of Majority, supra note 41.
44. See Maggie Astor, 16-Year-Olds Want a Vote. Fifty Years Ago, So Did 18N.Y.
TIMES
(May
19,
2019),
Year-Olds,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/19/us/politics/voting-age.html
[https://perma.cc/XSY9-8GD6]; Andrew Glass, Congress Changes Draft Age, Nov.
11, 1942, POLITICO (Nov. 11, 2014), https://www.politico.com/story/2014/11/this-dayin-politics-congress-draft-november-11-1942-112752 [https://perma.cc/LU7F-S559].
45. See The 26th Amendment, supra note 40.
46. See Scott Warren, This Is Why 16-Year-Olds Should Be Able to Vote, N.Y.
POST (Mar. 2, 2019, 9:17 AM), https://nypost.com/2019/03/02/this-is-why-16-year-oldsshould-be-able-to-vote [https://perma.cc/C29M-8EPQ].
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
48. See Jenny Diamond Cheng, How Eighteen-Year-Olds Got the Vote 6, 10
(Aug. 4, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2818730
[https://perma.cc/2MWP-NKSB]; Astor, supra note 44.
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civic obligations of adulthood. This particular disparity between
voting and service ages in the line between childhood and adulthood
became untenable. This was not, in effect, an argument about
development. It was an argument about justice in two anchors of
civic adulthood.

i. Benchmarking: Setting the Voting Age at the Age of Military
Service
The law allocates various privileges of childhood and adulthood at
different ages, generally falling between 16 and 21; the literature
discussing civic maturity raises questions of consistency from one
specific domain to the next, with age decisions grounded as often in
Yet the argument for a
pragmatics as in political theory.49
relationship between military service and the franchise is particularly
compelling; it seems true that if you are old enough to die for your
country, you are old enough to participate in its democratic
processes.50 Benchmarking is a powerful force in arguments about
the transition to adulthood, no place more clearly than the military as
a benchmark for voting. I am seeking to illustrate that voting by the
association to other incidents of adulthood does not in itself prove the
case for voting, though benchmarking of a new 16-year-old voting age
may enhance the legal maturity of the age 16 more broadly.
Given that younger military conscription came before younger
voting, their equation begs a question: What makes a person old
enough to die for their country? Surprisingly, it was in part the
immaturity of 18-year-olds, not their maturity, that fueled their
conscription. The age for military conscription was lowered to 18
from 21 at a time when the country needed more soldiers, particularly
those who were not yet married with dependents.51 There was value
in expanding the overall pool of men to fight by adding 18–20-yearolds, yet the benefit of the younger draft was in part that 18-year-olds

49. See Charles C. W. Cooke, The Age of Majority Is a Mess, NAT’L REV. (Feb.
28, 2018, 10:20 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/voting-age-lowered-16no-consistency/ [https://perma.cc/BDE3-MPQ2]; Jeff Jacoby, Lower the Voting Age?
Let’s Raise It Instead, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 15, 2019, 5:07 PM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2019/03/15/lower-voting-age-let-raiseinstead/wOapyrwQTEVgjT7btjasuK/story.html
[https://perma.cc/48WN-5FHU];
Holly N. S. White, Why We’re Letting Americans Vote, Marry, and Drink Far Too
Young,
WASH.
POST
(May
29,
2019,
6:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/05/29/why-were-letting-americansvote-marry-drink-far-too-young/ [https://perma.cc/49CE-377V].
50. See Astor, supra note 44.
51. See Cheng, supra note 48, at 15.
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had less civic maturity than those older men, who were already
supporting dependents.52 No military casualty is welcome, but the
death of a soldier with young children or a wife was thought to be the
worst kind, impacting financial dependents and cutting into the
family.53 In 1942, Congress granted draft deferment to married
men,54 with Senator Joshua Lee of Oklahoma saying “[w]e want the
unmarried men taken first.”55 In this sense, the military was looking
not just for more people but for younger people, who had not yet
matured into married life or parenthood. The age of 18 represented
to the military some sweet spot between childhood and adulthood.
Some may believe that the decision was driven by a conception of
mature adulthood presaging today’s neuroscience, but there is
evidence that it was driven by a peculiar military decision to exploit
the unattached immaturity of the 18-year-old.
Despite the intuitive nexus between service and voting, the current
voting age movement hopes to separate the two for analysis. Its claim
might be that a 16-year-old is ready to vote, but not yet ready to serve
in the military. Indeed, I doubt very much that advocates of 16-yearold voting would want any analogies made to military service that
would suggest the introduction of a lower draft or enlistment age.
Those advocates would likely see a conscripted or enlisted 16-yearold as a child-soldier, because in the military context, a 16-year-old
looks to most people like a child.
Once the decision to draft 18-year-olds was embedded in civic
understanding, the case for voting age parity was intuitively
compelling, but still worthy of analysis. A general notion of highest
civic duty (military service) and highest civic right (the franchise) as a
benchmarked pair might be grounded in different theories, in
addition to benchmarking as its own argument. One theory is that 18-

52. Id.
53. See Dominique McIndoe, June 26, 1942: Married Men to Get Draft
Deferment — For Now, SETON HALL U.: WORLD WAR 2.0,
https://blogs.shu.edu/ww2-0/1942/06/26/married-men-to-get-draft-deferment-for-now/
[https://perma.cc/SYX7-VYE8] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (student project of creating
historical news articles using information that would have been available at the time
but written in contemporary style); Kara Dixon Vuic, Women May Soon Have to
Register for the Draft, It’s Long Overdue, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/03/04/women-may-soon-have-registerdraft-its-long-overdue/ [https://perma.cc/GZ6V-PS67].
54. See C. P. Trussell, Deferring of Married Men in Draft Is Written into
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
13,
1942),
Allowances
Bill,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1942/06/13/issue.html
[https://perma.cc/82D7-9HX4].
55. See McIndoe, supra note 53.
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year-olds have earned the right of political participation through their
acts of military service. A second is that the possibility of forced
service demonstrates the stake that 18-year-olds have in the outcome
of political debates. Benchmarking in and of itself, earned franchise,
and a stake in politics all re-appear in debates over the current effort
to lower the voting age to 16.

ii. Earning the Vote Through Service in the Military
The argument for earned franchise at 18 has rhetorical force so
strong that it seems to require little unpacking. Yet women, too,
received the franchise at 18, though they have not been subject to the
military draft,56 and the vast majority of 18 to 21-year-olds never
“earned” their right to vote by actually serving in the military.57 In an
earned franchise argument, the age itself must be the important focal
point: “old enough to fight, old enough to vote.”58 If so, the notion
that the franchise is earned with service is not the truth of the case;
the case rests on a theory about the age 18, an age that has itself been
burnished and elevated in many aspects by the fact that it is useful to
the military. In this way, 18 as a status has earned the right to vote.
Conceptions of the age 18 developed over the twentieth century are
not necessarily well supported by twenty-first-century neuroscience,
which is showing that the cognitive capacity continues to develop into
a person’s mid-twenties.59 This new information is unlikely to change
the political equation of military service with the franchise, if 18-yearolds vote because their exposure to military service is a form of
earning the franchise.

56. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981).
57. See Mona Chalabi, What Percentage of Americans Have Served in the
Military?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Mar.
19,
2015,
6:19
AM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-percentage-of-americans-have-served-inthe-military/ [https://perma.cc/4MF6-E6CG] (about 7.3% of Americans have served).
58. See generally Joseph P. Williams, ‘Old Enough to Fight, Old Enough to Vote’:
The 26th Amendment’s Mixed Legacy (July 1, 2016), U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-07-01/old-enough-to-fight-old-enough-to[https://perma.cc/C7HQ-KY5N]
(the
vote-the-26th-amendments-mixed-legacy
movement for lowering the voting age from 21 to 18 centered on the idea that if a
person is old enough to be sent to war, he should be old enough to vote for the
Commander-in-Chief who sends him to war).
59. See Mariam Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 449, 453 (2013); Sarah B. Johnson et al.,

Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience
Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 1, 3 (2009).
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iii. Stakeholding: Enfranchising Citizens Who Have a Stake in
Political Issues
The second argument for benchmarking the voting age against the
age of military service is that the possibility of conscription at 18, and
the risk of death, places an intense spotlight on the stake an 18-yearold has in choosing political leaders. One choice may increase the
chance of foolish war, another the chance of righteous war, a third
choice might lead to a lower conflict path to achieving national goals.
This is also intuitively persuasive. Yet if you turn 18 in January, you
might be drafted before you ever cast your first vote in a national
election, the level of government at which questions of war are
decided. To influence the likelihood of your own death at war, it
might make sense to extend the franchise to 14 or 15, when the roots
of future conflict still allow for diplomatic approaches. Perhaps this
states the argument too literally — it is not that voting at 18 increases
or decreases your own risk of sacrificing your life for your country.
Rather, voting at 18 becomes a proxy for 18-year-olds as a group,
today and in the future, who may be subject to the military draft. The
18-year-old age group has a substantial stake in electoral outcomes,
and should therefore participate in elections. Given the vast
developmental inequality beginning at birth for children born into
poverty and experiencing unequal schooling, we might think that 5year-olds also have substantial stake in government policy sufficient
to justify their participation in elections.60 Yet the death risk
associated with the draft gives unique force to the arguments about a
“stake” in the choice of representatives in government.
The next Section explores these three modes of argument
underlying the military-voting link that supports the age 18 franchise
in the age 16 context: benchmarking to an age respected for
independent reasons, earned participation in the political process, and
stakeholder arguments (enfranchisement because of “skin in the
game”). It considers the use of each in the current debates over a 16year-old voting age, and the risks. Finally, this Section describes an
additional set of arguments appearing in the new debate that relate to
developmental neuroscience rather than to benchmarking, and that
link the science of development to the potential improvement of
democracy through increasing rates of participation in elections.

60. See DOWD, supra note 22, at 11–27 (exploring the ways that state-sponsored
poverty and schooling influence development for very young children).
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B. Translation of the Age 18 Arguments to the Age 16
The arguments for lowering the voting age to 18 were successful
and had intuitive and substantive force. An examination of today’s
movement to lower the voting age to 16 shows parallels to those
winning arguments for the 26th Amendment, with military service the
most striking difference from those arguments.

i. Benchmarking
Given the history, perhaps it is unsurprising that arguments both
for and against a 16-year-old voting age are overwhelmingly
embedded in comparison to other “ages of adulthood.”
In
newspapers and other short-form media, in particular, discussion of
lowering the voting age centers around a litany of activities tied to
various ages, depending on the writer’s position. Children can drive
when they turn 16 and cannot drink until they turn 21, and until they
turn 18, for example, children may not be held to their contracts, buy
cigarettes or a lottery ticket, marry without parental permission, get a
ten year passport, or work full-time during the school year.61
Accordingly, this argument goes, individuals should not be able to
vote until they turn 18. The argument from consistency and
benchmarking is marshaled by proponents of lowering the voting age
as well. After all, 16-year-olds can be subject to adult prosecution,
pay taxes on wages, drive cars, engage in sexual conduct, and may

61. See, e.g., Morris Chafetz, Adulthood at 18 — Not 16, Not 21, BALTIMORE SUN
(July 22, 1996), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1996-07-22-1996204061story.html [https://perma.cc/6UYC-TNBT]; Margaret Drye, Welcome to Adulthood,
Sort Of, VALLEY NEWS (May 13, 2017), https://www.vnews.com/the-age-ofadulthood-9808673 [https://perma.cc/A5GJ-7DKE]; Mark Oppenheimer, Opinion,
Marry at 16, Get Drafted at 18, Drink at 21 . . . Who Counts as an Adult?, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 13 2017), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-oppenheimer-agemajority-20170313-story.html [https://perma.cc/3HPL-XLJS]; Jan Murphy, Old
Enough to Marry? Or Buy Cigarettes? Age Matters in Bills Before PA. Lawmakers,
PA POST (June 17, 2019), https://papost.org/2019/06/17/old-enough-to-marry-or-buycigarettes-age-matters-in-bills-before-pa-lawmakers/ [https://perma.cc/2RHA-79FZ];
Katherine Viti, New Smoking Law Misunderstands Adult Responsibility, CAVALIER
DAILY (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.cavalierdaily.com/article/2019/02/viti-newsmoking-law-misunderstands-adult-responsibility [https://perma.cc/EQA4-DNPN];
Froma Harrop, Age Discrimination for the Young, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Feb. 9,
2010),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/02/09/age_discrimination_for_the_you
ng_100223.html [https://perma.cc/PA54-7NST]; Talk of the Nation: When Does
Responsibility Begin? 16, 18, 21?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 7, 2009),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113579236
[https://perma.cc/M9RU-8XT5].
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even donate blood.62 These responsibilities suggest a flexible process
of arriving at adulthood, with a number of indications that 16-yearolds have been judged by society to possess significant capabilities
and responsibilities to the state that may align with exercising the
franchise. Yet the age of majority remains 18 in almost all states, with
children’s entitlement to parental and state protection ending when
they reach that age.63 The vast majority of less visible regulations and
private law treat 18 as the end of legal childhood protections, or
disabilities, which are often the same thing.
These arguments for voting from comparison to other incidents of
adulthood may sound in benchmarking logic, but they may also
collapse in that logic, because we are not perfectly consistent across
our age-based benchmarks for adulthood. In addition, we cannot
even organize our age-based gateways by developmental milestones,
with each gateway determined by the particular cognitive maturity
needed for the task in question relative to the average developmental
age. To the contrary, the ages set for various gateways seem to serve
the needs of the system rather than reflect the maturity of the child.
Sixteen-year-olds are particularly ill-prepared to begin driving
because they still have poor impulse control, even as they may possess
the maturity of an adult in more deliberative contexts.64 Yet they
drive at 16, through a combination of poor public transportation
alternatives, poor suburban design that generates car dependency,
rural car dependency, and significant legal subsidy to automobile
usage over other forms of transportation.65 Sixteen-year-olds crash
and die at significantly higher rates than their 18-year-old
counterparts.66 In some places, they may drive a car at 16,67 but

62. See e.g., Information for Student Donors, AM. RED CROSS,
https://www.redcrossblood.org/donate-blood/how-to-donate/info-for-studentdonors.html [https://perma.cc/2BSF-2ZBH] (some states allow 16-years-olds to
donate blood with parental consent).
63. See Termination of Child Support Age of Majority, supra note 41.
64. See Vivian Hamilton, Liberty Without Capacity: Why States Should Ban
Adolescent Driving, 48 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1062 (2014).
65. See generally George H. Shill, Should the Law Subsidize Driving?, 95 N.Y.U.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3345366 [https://perma.cc/VZ8TERCV] (discussing the ways that society and the law subsidize driving to a dangerous
degree).
66. See Hamilton, supra note 64, at 1063.
67. See generally Teen and Novice Drivers, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY
ASS’N,
https://www.ghsa.org/state-laws/issues/Teen-and-Novice-Drivers
[https://perma.cc/ZZE3-RKN6] (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
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cannot choose to bypass a bicycle helmet until they are 18,68 though a
helmet decision is less impulsive than braking distance. There is
simply no benefit to allowing the 16-year-old to go without a helmet,
while there is a societal benefit to the 16-year-old driving a car,
whatever the risks. This age evaluation is not about maturity; it is
pragmatic.
Yet voting is not the bureaucratic and pragmatic incident of the
maturation process and pragmatic needs that driving is, but rather the
most significant metric of citizenship against which other gateways
will be measured. If benchmarking has intuitive appeal that has and
will translate into policy, we need to be forward-looking about what
could be benchmarked to a lower voting age in future debates. For
example, a 16-year-old voting age risks beating back an active effort
to raise the driving age to 18, one endorsed by the Insurance Institute
for Highway Safety.69 If benchmarking has force in the debate over
16-year-old voting, that debate should focus on the potential harm 16year-old voting could inflict on other areas of law, given the weight
and authority of the franchise. Rather than examining what we
currently ask of 16-year-olds and grant to 16-year-olds, we need to
consider what else we might come to ask of them in a world with 16year-old voting.

ii. Stakeholder Arguments
Some argue that because 16-year-olds are still supported by their
parents and are usually not in the workforce, they do not have “skin
in the game.”70 The same argument can support a voting age of 16,
68. See Bicycle Helmet Laws, HELMETS.ORG, https://helmets.org/mandator.htm
[https://perma.cc/AX2S-QSMK] (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
69. See States Urged to Raise the Driving Age, CBS NEWS (Sep. 10, 2008),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/states-urged-to-raise-the-driving-age/
[https://perma.cc/D5KY-BFWQ].
70. See generally Alyson Johnston, Lowering Voting Age to 16 is a Bad Idea,
PAMPLIN MEDIA GROUP (Apr. 3, 2019), https://pamplinmedia.com/wsp/138schools/424280-329522-lowering-voting-age-to-16-is-a-bad-idea
[https://perma.cc/L9NZ-7DZX] (arguing that teenagers should not have the ability to
vote because they do not have the same obligations as working adults); Jen Kuznicki,
Don’t Lower the Voting Age. Raise It, CONSERVATIVE REV. (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://www.conservativereview.com/news/dont-lower-voting-age-raise/
[https://perma.cc/TFL7-D392] (arguing that 16-year-olds are not mature enough to
vote); John Laidler, Should the Voting Age Be Lowered for Town Elections?, BOS.
GLOBE
(Mar.
22,
2019),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/globelocal/2019/03/22/should-lower-votingage/YudoB9JpBXgzPIAiZp52kK/story.htm
[https://perma.cc/8MSZ-HQ9T]
(discussing how young people desire the ability to vote but face opposition from state
representatives).
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though, because 16-year-olds are often in the workforce part-time,
and pay taxes on their earnings to the government in which they have
no voting voice. While military service is the literal “skin in the
game,” we should remember that public education is one of the most
substantial uses of government resources, and children certainly have
a stake in its quality, character, and level of funding.
The stakeholder question does not rest solely on the rights of
children to shape their destiny, but on the impact that electoral
accountability has on political agendas.
Politicians campaign
vigorously on addressing the costs of higher education,71 an issue of
great interest to 18-year-old voters. However, elementary school
funding is not the center of anyone’s campaign, unless the campaign is
focused on the worthy cause of raising teacher pay,72 a focus which
results from a constituency of adult voters more than from a desire to
direct funds to children.73 Regardless of whether children have the

71. See, e.g.,
College and Workforce Training, CORY BOOKER
https://corybooker.com/issues/college-and-workforce-training/
[https://perma.cc/P3F7-XNUU] (last visited Aug. 9, 2019); College for All and Cancel
All Student Debt, BERNIE SANDERS https://berniesanders.com/issues/college-for-all/
[https://perma.cc/VY9K-8H3W] (last visited Aug. 9, 2019); I’m Calling for Something

Truly Transformational: Universal Free Public College and Cancellation of Student
Loan Debt, MEDIUM (Apr. 22, 2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/im-calling-

for-something-truly-transformational-universal-free-public-college-and-cancellationof-a246cd0f910f [https://perma.cc/GS44-NEXR].
72. See, e.g., Sydney Ember, Julián Castro Unveils Education Plan With Focus on
Universal
Pre-K,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
13,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/us/politics/julian-castro-education-2020.html
[https://perma.cc/UV4L-QAE4] (discussing Julián Castro’s presidential campaign
promise to impart a federal tax credit that would increase teacher pay); Nik DeCostaKlipa, Elizabeth Warren Pledges to Appoint Former Public School Teacher as
Education
Secretary,
BOSTON.COM
(May
13,
2019),
https://www.boston.com/news/politics/2019/05/13/elizabeth-warren-educationsecretary
[https://perma.cc/DQ9B-KKNB]
(discussing
Elizabeth
Warren’s
presidential campaign promise to appoint a former public school teacher as education
secretary);
Raising
Teacher
Pay,
KAMALA
HARRIS
FOR
PEOPLE,
https://kamalaharris.org/issue/raising-teacher-pay/ [https://perma.cc/H7FM-2AWR]
(last visited Aug. 9, 2019) (discussing Kamala Harris’s presidential campaign promise
to make federal investment to close the teacher pay gap); Emma Kinery, Klobuchar
Unveils Plan to Steer More Money to K-12 Education, BLOOMBERG (July 5, 2019,
3:34 P.M.), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-05/klobuchar-unveilsplan-to-steer-more-money-to-k-12-education
[https://perma.cc/9ZHP-U72H]
(discussing Amy Klobuchar’s presidential campaign promise to increase federal
funding for K-12 education and require states to increase teacher pay).
73. Chris Baylor, Teachers’ Unions May Not Raise Pay — But They Do Bolster
the
Democratic
Party,
WASH.
POST
(May
18,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/18/teachers-unionsmay-not-raise-pay-but-they-do-bolster-the-democratic-party/
[https://perma.cc/GQU2-WMLE]; Michelle Hackman, Democratic Candidates Step
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mental capacity to make an electoral decision, they are stakeholders
from the start, and their lack of franchise may shape the government
resources allocated to them.74
Within ten years, the federal
government will spend half its resources on adults over age 65.75 At
present, the federal government spends only one-quarter of the
amount on children that it does on adults over 65.76 Whether this is
justified on the merits, it certainly coincides with the voter/nonvoter
divide and supports the role that “stakeholder” arguments could play
in lowering the voting age. Some have argued that as long as children
cannot vote, if we expect their parents’ votes to protect their interests,
we should be granting parents an extra vote for each child they have,
to be a proxy vote cast on the child’s behalf as their legal
representative.77 Finally, the stakeholder argument against 16-yearolds neglects to consider the problems of the future. Arguably, adult
voters are particularly bad at considering either the climate crisis or
the national debt, for example — both having long time horizons of
greatest significance to children, and highly discounted by older
voters.78

iii. Earning the Vote
While 16-year-olds, and younger children, have a substantial stake
in the choice of elected representatives, their service to their country
is relatively weak. While some 16-year-olds do work and pay taxes to

Up

Courtship
of
Teachers,
WALL
ST.
J.
(May
19,
2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/democratic-candidates-step-up-courtship-of-teachers11559142000 [https://perma.cc/KQY3-G2FM].
74. See generally DOWD, supra note 22, at 9–50 (discussing all of the ways policy
negatively shapes children from a very young age).
75. See Howard Gleckman, The Federal Government Will Spend Half Its Budget
on Older Adults in Ten Years, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2019, 9:33 A.M.),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardgleckman/2019/02/01/the-federal-governmentwill-spend-half-its-budget-on-older-adults-in-ten-years/#959065856b6f
[https://perma.cc/TT3C-JP9V].
76. See Michael Collins, Report: The Federal Government Is Spending Less
Money on Children and More on the Elderly, USA TODAY (June 7, 2018, 10:35
A.M.),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/06/07/report-federalgovernment-spends-more-elderly-than-kids/677011002/
[https://perma.cc/2ULWE7RZ].
77. Jane Rutherford, One Child, One Vote: Proxies for Parents, 82 MINN. L. REV.
1463, 1496, 1507 (1997).
78. Joel Stein, Why Older People Shouldn’t Vote, TIME (Aug. 18, 2019),
https://time.com/4457131/why-older-people-shouldnt-vote-and-other-ideasunpopular-with-my-parents/ [https://perma.cc/JRG9-7F6J].
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the government on their wages,79 many do not,80 and even those who
do work are sometimes prevented by law from working full-time
during the school year.81 Relative to earning the franchise through
military service to the nation, 16-year-olds have not earned the vote
through service, other than the payment of a relatively small amount
in taxes.
Yet there is a second way that 18-year-olds “earned” their
franchise: through political engagement. Youth activism during the
Vietnam War was intense, and the political system saw the exercise of
that generation’s collective political voice in protests, legislative
testimony, publications, as well as protest music, art, and literature.82
While the military age was lowered during World War II, the visibility
of a collective youth constituency did not emerge until the political
turbulence of the 1960s, which saw “children” between 18 and 21
participate in direct action civil rights protests, freedom summer, the
1968 Democratic convention protests in Chicago, and anti-war
protests across the country.83 The development of a meaningful
collective political voice of a generation not-yet-21 can be
characterized as part of the “earning” process, in the sense of
demonstrating readiness for civic engagement.
This argument — that readiness to vote is demonstrated by
meaningful political mobilization — plays a significant role in the
movement to lower the voting age to 16. Most recent literature about
the voting age highlights the Parkland, Florida students, who survived
a mass shooting at their high school and quickly mobilized a youth
political movement in favor of gun control legislation.84 Parkland
79. Filing Requirements, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Sep. 20, 2019),
https://www.irs.gov/faqs/filing-requirements-status-dependents/filing-requirements
[https://perma.cc/799L-DVGP ] (if children make more than a standard deduction,
their wages are taxable); Kelly Phillips Erb, What Kids And Their Parents Should
Know About Summer Jobs And Taxes, FORBES (July 5, 2018, 1:53 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2018/07/05/what-kids-and-their-parentsshould-know-about-summer-jobs-and-taxes/#1ec047bf1ce4 [https://perma.cc/T9NUU7V5].
80. See Teri Morisi, Teen Trends, U.S. DEP’T LAB. BLOG (Mar. 9, 2017)
https://blog.dol.gov/2017/03/09/teens-trends
[https://perma.cc/67RL-VZUK]
(approximately one-third of teenagers have paying jobs).
81. See generally U.S. DEP’T LAB., SELECTED STATE CHILD LABOR STANDARDS
AFFECTING MINORS UNDER 18 IN NON-FARM EMPLOYMENT AS OF JANUARY 1, 2019
(2019), https://www.dol.gov/whd/state/nonfarm.htm [https://perma.cc/VR4B-4F7F].
82. Cheng, supra note 48, at 6–7; Hamilton, supra note 7, at 1462.
83. See Maggie Astor, 7 Times in History When Students Turned to Activism,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/us/student-protestmovements.html [https://perma.cc/T3V4-XEC3]; Astor, supra note 44.
84. See, e.g., Voght, supra note 6.
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galvanized youth to organize the 2018 March for Our Lives in D.C.
and over 800 locations across the country, one of the largest protests
in U.S. history.85 March for Our Lives, Never Again MSD (Marjory
Stoneham Douglas High School, the site of the shooting), and the
online and in-person activism of the Parkland students have fueled
claims for the franchise for those ready and able to exercise their
political voice so effectively.86 The Parkland students might serve as
the emblem of what political agency looks like among teenagers when
adequate community resources have supported their childhood
development. A global youth climate strike in September of 2019
demonstrated the ability of youth to work internationally on futuredirected activism.87 The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement
engages young adults in political action as well, through direct action
protests as well as political lobbying,88 though it is less frequently
cited when marshaling arguments for the youth franchise,89 as its
events are often portrayed in the media as spontaneous and stochastic
rather than strategic examples of an earned political voice.90 These

85. March for Our Lives Highlights: Students Protesting Guns Say ‘Enough Is
Enough’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/24/us/marchfor-our-lives.html [https://perma.cc/KXU2-6XGV]; Michael D. Shear, Students Lead
Huge Rallies for Gun Control Across the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2018),

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/24/us/politics/students-lead-huge-rallies-for-guncontrol-across-the-us.html [https://perma.cc/B945-MCTF]; Emily Witt, From
Parkland to Sunrise: A Year of Extraordinary Youth Activism, NEW YORKER (Feb.
13, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-parkland-to-sunrise-ayear-of-extraordinary-youth-activism [https://perma.cc/W4CR-3RMK].
86. Voght, supra note 6.
87. Brian Resnick & Danielle Scruggs, Photos: What the Youth Climate Strike
Looks like Around the World, VOX (Sept. 20, 2019, 2:57 PM),
https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/9/20/20875523/youth-climatestrike-fridays-future-photos-global [https://perma.cc/N5YZ-UAQT].
88. See Melinda D. Anderson, From Civil Rights to Black Lives Matter: How
Student Activism Spreads to High-School Campuses, ATLANTIC (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/11/student-activism-historyinjustice/417129/ [https://perma.cc/FGS6-5QMY].
89. See Dahleen Glanton, As Country Listens to Florida Teens, Black Lives
CHI.
TRIB.
(Oct.
8,
2019),
Matter
Youths
Feel
Ignored,
https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/dahleen-glanton/ct-met-florida-teens-blacklives-matter-dahleen-glanton-20180223-story.html [https://perma.cc/SFW6-WQMF];
Emily Witt, Calling B.S. in Parkland, Florida, NEW YORKER (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/three-days-in-parkland-florida
[https://perma.cc/FAZ9-5NRW].
90. See P.R. Lockhart, Parkland is Sparking a Difficult Conversation about Race,
Trauma,
and
Public
Support,
VOX
(Oct.
8,
2019),
https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/2/24/17044904/parkland-shooting-race-traumamovement-for-black-lives-gun-violence
[https://perma.cc/8HZ2-HJ5H];
Adia
Robinson, After 5 Years, Black Lives Matter Inspires New Protest Movements, ABC
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media portrayals underestimate the organization and efficacy within
the BLM movement,91 just as media portrayals failed to grasp the
strategic sophistication of the civil rights direct action protests of the
1960s.92 The icons of the movement to lower the voting age seem to
be drawn most often from Parkland and not BLM, a problem that
reflects a concern this Article raises about the relationship between
the 16 voting age movement, developmental injustice, and the underaged grooming of African American youth to lose the franchise
through involvement with the juvenile justice system.
C. Newcomer Arguments for Lowering the Voting Age to 16
As the previous discussion suggests, some of the arguments for
lowering the voting age to 16 have correlates in the successful effort
to lower the voting age to 18 fifty years ago. But there are new modes
of argument, not seen in the 26th Amendment debate, that are
prominent in today’s movement, and they feature developmental
neuroscience. The relationship between Dowd’s work in support of
developmental equality and the movement to lower the voting age is
underscored by these more recent modes of argument fueling this
political movement. These arguments are grounded first in cognitive
development neuroscience, and second in the role of development in
creating a voting habit.

i. Cognitive Development
Arguments from developmental neuroscience have begun
appearing throughout the legal system, whether deployed to mitigate
negative consequences of immature behavior, including the impulsive

NEWS (Oct. 8, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/years-black-lives-matterinspires-protest-movements/story?id=56702439 [https://perma.cc/7LLG-CHQ5].
91. See Russell Rickford, Black Lives Matter: Toward a Modern Practice of Mass
Struggle,
NEW
LAB.
FORUM
(Oct.
8,
2019),
https://newlaborforum.cuny.edu/2015/12/28/black-lives-matter-practice-of-massstruggle/ [https://perma.cc/L5KM-4CAE]; Lockhart, supra note 90.
92. See Elahe Izadi, Black Lives Matter and America’s Long History of Resisting
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
11,
2019),
Civil
Rights
Protesters,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/04/19/black-lives-matters-andamericas-long-history-of-resisting-civil-rights-protesters/
[https://perma.cc/H9ZKKERU]; Barbara Reynolds, I Was a Civil Rights Activist in the 1960s. But It’s Hard
for Me to Get Behind Black Lives Matter, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/08/24/i-was-a-civil-rightsactivist-in-the-1960s-but-its-hard-for-me-to-get-behind-black-lives-matter/
[https://perma.cc/7TPC-2ZEU].
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commission of crimes,93 or instead to justify the developmental
capacity for adult decision-making in the reproductive context.94
Though age-based legal capacities remain overwhelmingly
determined by “common knowledge” of maturity and practical need
for bright lines tied to particular activities, courts and legislatures are
increasingly referencing developmental neuroscience when making
decisions about the appropriate legal standard to apply to a minor or
young adult.95 Given the move toward debating maturity in the
language of developmental neuroscience, it is not surprising that
developmental neuroscience emerges in the more serious legal and
political science literature addressing the voting age.96
Neuroscience supports the concept of domain-specific competence,
meaning the developmental capacity to act like an adult in certain
domains, depending on what portions of the cognitive apparatus are
needed for a given task, relative to the typical maturation rate of
those particular cognitive functions.97 Vivian Hamilton argues that
the level of specificity about maturation rates of particular capacities
has improved to the point that it may be relied on to make decisions
about regulating the passage to adulthood by domain. In particular,
teenagers are ready to make considered judgments at an earlier age
than they are prepared to make pressured decisions. Teenagers are
mature in “cold” reasoning but less so in “hot” reasoning:
Converging research from several disciplines within the
developmental sciences has established a reliable connection
between age range and the attainment of certain cognitive
competencies. Research in developmental psychology and cognitive
and social neuroscience explains not only that adolescents make
notoriously bad decisions under certain conditions, but also why it is
they do so. This research explains that by mid-adolescence, when
making unpressured, considered decisions — like those required to

93. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 68 (2010); DOWD, supra note 22, at 127.
94. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 428 (1990); Planned Parenthood
Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 491 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); DOWD, supra note 22, at
127.
95. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 491;
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 648; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74; DOWD, supra note 22, at 127.
96. See, e.g., Hamilton supra note 7, at 1504.
97. See Arthur Elster, Lowering the Voting Age to Sixteen: The Case for
Enhancing Youth Civic Engagement, 29 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 64, 65–66 (2009).
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privately cast a ballot in an election that has unfolded over time —
their cognitive competencies are mature.98

“Domain-specific competence” suggests voting at age 15 or 16
would be appropriate because adolescents possess “adultlike
cognitive processing capacities.”99 They have the adult capacity to
gather information, retain it, retrieve it, and to reason.100 These skills
are relevant to voting; they are deliberate skills.101 Adolescents are
less developed when it comes to impulse control and rash judgments,
which are influenced by different parts of their cognitive
development. That slower rate of development for impulse control
can be used to explain why a 21-year-old drinking age lowers accident
rates.102 Hamilton’s careful work makes the case persuasively that
neuroscience supports the ability of 16-year-olds to vote, and
questions of cognitive maturity should not exclude 16- and 17-yearolds from the franchise. Hamilton pairs this cognitive evidence with a
general presumption of universal suffrage, exceptions to which
require careful justification, and finds that maturity cannot be that
careful justification for postponing the vote until age 18.103
Note that the body of work on cognitive development and the
adolescent franchise is decontextualized from other policy questions,
including the benchmarking to other adult gateways, political
conceptions of earning citizenship, and becoming a stakeholder.
Moreover, current research does not explore the variability in
developmental neuroscience, depending on life circumstances, that is
the touchstone of Dowd’s work, nor does it notice the
decontextualized subject in neuroscience discussion.104 Given a
cognitive development framework relatively detached from the
context in which children develop, the literature connecting
neuroscience to voting age cannot reflect on the normative social,
economic, and educational circumstances that could problematize a
narrative about “typical” development. Instead, the body of work
promoting neuroscience as a reason to lower the voting age
demonstrates the significant gap that Dowd’s book fills, one that
credits neuroscience but places it in a web of external context and
state action. Viewing the new literature connecting voting to

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Hamilton, supra note 7, at 1448–49.
Id. at 1510.
See id. at 1510–11.
See Douglas, supra note 35, at 1059.
See generally Hamilton, supra note 64, at 1079.
See Hamilton, supra note 7, at 1513.
See DOWD, supra note 22, at 60–65.
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development through Dowd’s lens, we can see that “cognitive
readiness” to participate in the franchise, readiness to speak in the
very political system that determines so much about cognitive
readiness, is a complicated criterion to deploy in an ultimately
political question about readiness to exercise political power.
Considering development in the context of childhood experiences, we
can see a different politics to the use of cognitive maturity in a
discussion of political participation. The question is one of political
power, not what an idealized and supported teen brain can achieve.

ii. Development’s Relationship to Voter Participation Rates
Lowering the voting age may have long term net positive
consequences for voter turnout by developing in youth the habit of
voting.105 Precisely because 18-year-olds are making a series of other
developmental transitions toward adulthood, including graduating
from high school and often leaving home, they lack the attention to
this one particular aspect of adulthood in the mix of other
transitions.106 Based on this theory, introducing a habit of voting at
16, when fewer aspects of their lives are in flux, will lead to a higher
rate of participation in elections.107 There is some evidence from
Austria that 16-year-olds granted the franchise do, in fact, exercise it
at higher rates than those granted the franchise at age 18,108 bolstering
the case for those who want to see 16-year-olds vote in order to
improve their lifelong odds of voting regularly. Lowering the voting
age, then, may do something to improve the relatively low voter
turnout across the United States, and advocates for lowering the
voting age are motivated in part by this pragmatic impact.109
It is this portion of the movement to lower the voting age that
strikes most closely to the core of the dramatic injustice done by the
developmental inequality described in Dowd’s work. The effort to
cultivate in teenagers a lifelong habit of voting by extending the
franchise at just the right developmental moment — the moment

105. See Claudio Lopez-Guerra, Enfranchising Minors and the Mentally Impaired,
38 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 115, 120 (2012).
106. See Yosef Bhatti & Kasper M. Hansen, Leaving the Nest and the Social Act
of Voting: Turnout Among First-Time Voters, 22 J. ELECTIONS, PUB. OPINION &
PARTIES 380, 396 (2012); Douglas, supra note 35, at 1057.
107. See Douglas, supra note 35, at 1057.
108. See Eva Zegglovits & Julian Aichholzer, Are People More Inclined to Vote at

16 than at 18? Evidence for the First-Time Voting Boost Among 16–25-Year-Olds in
Austria, 24 J. ELECTIONS, PUB. OPINION & PARTIES 351, 358 (2014).
109. See Elster, supra note 97, at 67.
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when they are becoming activated but are not distracted by the full
burdens of adulthood — represents a high-order nurturing of the
development of political agency. By dramatic contrast, the state
action within the juvenile justice system and school discipline systems
significantly increase the odds of criminal justice involvement once
African American youth reach adulthood.110 African American
teenagers experience felony arrests at dramatically higher rates than
their white, Asian, or Hispanic peers. According to the City of New
York’s 2016 Disparity Report:
In 2014, the rates for Black males and females were 30.2 and 20.8
times higher than their White peers, while the rates for Hispanic
males and females were 8.5 and 6.5 times higher than their White
peers . . . . Asian females had the lowest rate of felony arrests for
individuals under age 16 at 0.1 arrests per 1,000 individuals, while
Black males had the highest rate at 10 arrests per 1,000 individuals
under age 16.111

This criminal justice involvement risks their long-term
disenfranchisement — the enduring denial of electoral political
agency.112 African American children are being primed for that
permanent disenfranchisement before they ever reach the voting age.
Viewed through the lens of the franchise, it appears that we are doing
everything possible to limit the possibility and potential that
developing youth of color will become sustained citizen participants
in the political process. Reference to developmental neuroscience
should not be deployed in the service of lowering the voting age if the
developmental neuroscience is to be decontextualized from the
developmental inequality wrought by unequal childhoods, especially
when that inequality puts some children on track to lose the vote
before they would ever be eligible for it. If lowering the voting age to
16 plays any role, no matter how inadvertent, in the further
Adultification of children most likely to fall under the jurisdiction of
the criminal justice system, that harm cannot be justified by a theory
of overall enhanced democratic participation, unevenly distributed.

110. See DOWD, supra note 22, at 47–49.
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(2016),
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112. See generally Christopher Uggen et al., 6 Million Lost Voters: State-Level
Estimates of Felony Disenfranchisement, 2016, SENTENCING PROJECT (Oct. 10, 2019
8:29 PM), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-statelevel-estimates-felony-disenfranchisement-2016/ [https://perma.cc/4NX5-GTB3].
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II. THE RIGHT TO PROTECTION FROM CAMPAIGNING
The campaign for a 16-year-old voting age fails to capture the
relationship between the disabilities that follow from the legal status
of minors, and protection of minors. The current debate over
lowering the voting age to 16 is woefully lacking in family law analysis
that conceptualizes many of the limits on childhood agency as serving
protective functions worth the imposition on the maturing youth. The
campaign to lower the voting age offers meaningful discussion of
whether youth will simply vote their parents’ preferences, or are
adequately represented already through their parents’ votes,113 or
have adequate civics knowledge to participate properly.114 But there
is no discussion of parents as gatekeepers to information, either in a
malevolent sense (“I would rather you not learn about Donald
Trump”), or in a protective sense (“I can cut off your access to 8chan
and prevent candidates from preying on your naiveté”). Yet disabling
youth from voting also protects youth from being the target of
campaigning. Substantial regulation already constrains the way
entities may communicate with minors, in an effort to prevent their
deception and exploitation,115 just as contract law protects them from
similar concerns.
Parents have substantial rights to protect 16-year-olds and to make
decisions about who may interact with a 16-year-old based on a
personalized adult understanding of that particular child’s needs. A
system that allows 16-year-olds to vote would either suffer because
the young voter cannot legally access information her parent chooses
to block, or it would eventually reduce the ability of parents to limit
contact between outside adults and their children.116 For example,
under federal law, a parent has the right to block military recruiters
from communicating with her child through the mail, on the phone, or
in person, if the parent believes that the child is too immature to

113. See Samantha Godwin, Children’s Oppression, Rights, and Liberation, 4 NW.
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115. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21.
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Concerns,
REUTERS
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2019)
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evaluate the prospect of enlisting in the military upon turning 18.117
Both consequences of youth voting — contraction of parental rights
and expansion of candidate access to voters — would present serious
challenges to the current state of the law. Advocates for 16-year-old
voting may intend to mount a case that it is time to remove parental
authority over 16-year-olds, but they have not said so. A move to
allow 16-year-old voting may lead to that reform without reflection
on the protective function that parental authority can serve.
Information and exercise of the franchise are highly entwined;
tobacco companies have a First Amendment right to target voters
with political speech. Yet Vote16 activism has been entirely devoid
of discussion of this problem with youth voting.
While a thorough treatment of these family law issues is beyond
the scope of this Article, the issues expose the movement’s relatively
isolated view of 16-year-olds as political agents, a view that can also
fail to connect to questions of juvenile justice and disenfranchisement
that a developmental equality framework makes visible. Advocates
for Vote16 focus on issues around voting, while child welfare
advocates focus on the capacities and needs of teenagers more
broadly, and the network of protection associated with those needs.
Until there is serious discussion of whether a 16-year-old right to the
franchise will curtail a parent’s ability to close down access to that 16year-old, whether by a cannabis advocate or a white nationalist
organization, the voting age proposal lacks a serious footing in the
law of the child or the law of political speech. Empowering 16-yearolds to make adult decisions sounds in good parenting, but subjecting
16-year-olds to adulthood, with its military service, its criminal justice
system, and its constriction on parental protection, requires more
thought, and claims from cognitive development need to include the
political and legal context of childhood.
Developmental justice requires developmental equality: a fair
distribution of developmental supports and the fair removal of
developmental assaults that are disproportionately allocated based on
race. Developmental justice also requires making room for positive
rights, as Dowd argues. Further support for a positive right to

117. See Damien Cave, Growing Problems for Military Recruits: Parents, N.Y.
TIMES (June 3, 2005). https://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/03/nyregion/growingproblem-for-military-recruiters-parents.html [https://perma.cc/J5NQ-2LQQ]; Lynn
Neary, Parents, Teens, and Military Recruiting, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 5, 2005)
https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=4730222
[https://perma.cc/76U3-ALDU].
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developmental justice can be found in two enabling rights: the state
law right to public education, and the right to vote.
III. SEEING A POSITIVE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN THE RIGHT TO
PUBLIC EDUCATION: PREPARATION FOR CITIZENSHIP
A claim for developmental justice could find support in the history
of public education. Carl Kaestle’s Pillars of the Republic: Common
Schools and American Society, 1780–1860, published in 1983, remains
the clearest account of the historical development of governmentsupported schooling, and explains the core relationship between a
positive right to education and successful democracy:
The nation’s Founding Fathers knew from classical political theory
that the most stable governments combined elements of monarchy,
aristocracy, and democracy. But Americans had expelled monarchy,
and revolutionary leaders stood firm against the creation of a formal
American aristocracy. How, then, were they to escape the
degeneration into anarchy that they believed was the inevitable fate
of pure democracies? They pinned their hopes on a republic . . . .
Here again, though, classical theory and much contemporary
opinion warned them that republican government would not work in
a country as large as America . . . . Education could play an
important role in reconciling freedom and order.
A sound
education would prepare men to vote intelligently and prepare
women to train their sons properly . . . . To foster the intelligence
required of republican citizens, some of America’s most eloquent
political leaders looked to education — not just through the
informal colonial modes of instruction but through schools
organized and financed by the states.118

Moreover, in 1787, Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison,
“[a]bove all things I hope the education of the common people will be
attended to, convinced that on their good sense we may rely with the
most security for the preservation of a due degree of liberty.”119
Liberty is the goal, self-governance the structure, and individuals
ready to vote are the mechanism. The Founders believed that the
system of negative rights that would protect liberty required the
preparation of the future voter through a system of state-financed
schools — the positive right on which negative rights to liberty would
rely. Education, though provided by the states and localities rather

118. CARL KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780–1860 4–5 (1983).
119. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 5 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 480 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892).
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than the federal government, would enable both state and federal
citizenship, which is essential to a functioning democracy.120
Jefferson introduced a bill in Virginia as early as 1779 to provide free
public education at the state level, and its preamble explicitly
connects education to the democratic experiment of popular selfgovernance:
[W]hence it becomes expedient for promoting the publick (sic)
happiness that those persons, whom nature hath endowed with
genius and virtue, should be rendered by liberal education worthy to
receive, and able to guard the sacred deposit of the rights and
liberties of their fellow citizens, and that they should be called to
that charge without regard to wealth, birth or other accidental
condition or circumstance; but the indigence of the greater number
disabling them from so educating, at their own expence (sic), those
of their children whom nature hath fitly formed and disposed to
become useful instruments for the public, it is better that such
should be sought for and educated at the common expence (sic) of
all, than that the happiness of all should be confided to the weak or
wicked.121

Reconceived as developmental rights, Jefferson displays concern
over the development of (white) future voters, and made no provision
for the education and development of the people he enslaved. He
treats the white citizen as normative, as developmental neuroscience
ordinarily does today.122 Yet he expounded on a necessary link
between becoming a voting citizen and the public provision of
preparation for that role, even as he set whites and Blacks on
radically different courses.
How do we transport the eighteenth-century conception of the
needs of democracy grounded in liberty into the present? Arguably,
Kaestle is describing a regime of positive rights, in the sense that the
framers of the republic believed that participatory democracy
depended on the preparation of minors to become effective voting
citizens (and at that time, the conception was limited to white men).
Almost 200 years later, the U.S. Supreme Court would hold that there
is no federally guaranteed right to education,123 but recent litigation
in a Rhode Island federal court seeks to raise the question again,

120. KAESTLE, supra note 117, at 5.
121. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, 18
June 1779 in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 526–535 (Julian P. Boyd ed.,
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given the tight nexus between self-governance and public
schooling.124
In 1973, when the Supreme Court declined to
characterize a federal right to public education in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, every single state
constitution already guaranteed a positive right to education.125
Federalism manages the issue of the democracy-enabling positive
right of education, and the absolute necessity of schooling in our
federal system is recognized as a state function and guarantee.126 A
right to education is already knit into the system of popular
sovereignty, so the failure of the U.S. Constitution to guarantee it
hardly undermines its centrality to democratic theory — voting
citizens will receive some state preparation before achieving the
franchise.
This historical link between the negative rights of our
constitutional design and a positive right to education bolsters the
argument for developmental justice and equality. The Constitution
relies on liberties that need to be protected by citizen-voters. Those
citizen-voters themselves need to be prepared to become citizenvoters to preserve the constitutional system. State-funded education,
on this original conception, is justified by the need to prepare citizens
to self-govern. Like voting itself, education becomes a structural
precondition of negative rights, even though, like voting, it is itself a
positive right, recognized under the state constitutions of all fifty
states.127 It is a small leap from a positive right to education to a
positive right to developmental justice and developmental equality
for that same democracy-saving purpose. As we break down
preparedness to participate in the democracy into developmental
neuroscience, we simply modernize the preconditions for a
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functioning democracy committed to negative liberties. There are
positive rights foundational to negative rights.
In effect, Dowd suggests that by the time we are old enough to
function as citizens, developmental injustice has changed who we
become based in large part on race, especially for boys.128 Dowd
emphasizes the violation of equality values and the existing state
action that creates the structures of developmental inequality to
arrive at a positive right to developmental justice.129 Even in a
government system entirely devoted to negative rights, an argument
for a substructure of positive rights that enable the broader negative
rights can include both developmental justice and voting itself and
find grounding in early thinking about state-financed schooling. In
considering the idea of enabling rights within our system, the next
Part explores voting as a positive right, and its relationship to
development as expressed through voting age and through juvenile
justice links to disenfranchisement. Development and political theory
of citizenship are intertwined, just as development and the disparate
experiences and environments of children are intertwined.
IV. VOTING IS A POSITIVE RIGHT
Dowd mounts an argument that developmental justice, even if it is
a positive right, can be achieved by reclaiming parts of constitutional
history often found in dissenting Supreme Court opinions.130 An
additional method of mounting her case can be advanced by
grounding her argument in two positive rights that enable a
functioning democracy. The first is the right to education discussed in
Part III, which appears in all 50 state constitutions. This Part
discusses the second, which is the right to vote. Taken together, these
rights set a framework for minimum requirements to operate the
popular democracy, and the reasoning for each could form the basis
for the addition of Dowd’s developmental justice to the group of
positive enabling rights.
Joseph Fishkin argues that in our system of negative rights, the
right to vote established and improved in the Constitution is best
characterized as a positive right:
Voters need help to vote. I do not mean that only a few voters or
certain groups of voters need help. State action is required if any of
us are to vote at all. The state must set up polling places, train
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workers, buy machines, print ballots. The entire enterprise of voting
requires positive action by the state. This is because voting is,
inescapably, a positive right.131

Voting is an enabling right. We cannot enjoy negative liberties
without a process substructure, and that substructure,
enfranchisement, is itself a positive right. A state may not withdraw
the right to vote on a claim that it is equally discriminating against all
citizens.132 The states must take action to create a voting structure
that enables the franchise. Similarly, Dowd’s lens can be used to
argue that development is a process right. This Article posits that
voting may be a promising analogy to Dowd’s positive right to equal
development: development is also enabling, and without it, teenagers
suffer “lifelong subordinating consequences that are difficult or
impossible to overcome.”133 Both childhood development and the
right to vote are the preconditions to a robust political system
grounded in negative rights. Voting and a right to equal development
can have common participatory democratic roots that can support
Dowd’s right to development. The debate over lowering the voting
age is grounded in part in ideas about both development and the
relationship between development and citizenship rights.
V. THE DEVELOPMENTAL EQUALITY LENS ON QUESTIONS OF
VOTING AGE
Dowd’s structural lens and the political lens can be used to shine a
bright light on the state of positive rights to development, their
relevance to the republican system of negative rights, and the
movement to lower the voting age based on the science of cognitive
development. We find one strong argument for developmental justice
in the foundational theory supporting public education — the state
needs to prepare citizens for self-governance to retain a functioning
democracy through voting.
We also find an analogy for
developmental justice in the right to vote: arguably, both function as
foundational positive rights enabling a system of negative right.
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Dowd’s work shows that the juvenile justice system is one of the
government structures interfering with equal development for
African American children. The system disproportionately targets
them, and experiences with the juvenile justice system dramatically
increase the odds that a child will eventually be entangled in the adult
criminal justice system if they are not already entangled in the adult
system as minors. That adult entanglement, with its roots in state
action toward minors, leads to the permanent disenfranchisement of
those in its grip. In effect, we are disenfranchising African American
youth before they ever reach the age of 18 because of
disproportionate juvenile justice system involvement, rather than
preparing them for a life of citizenship with proper developmental
support.
It is dizzying to attempt to untangle the political system that uses
law enforcement against African American youth, resulting in
developmental inequalities and eventual disenfranchisement, from
the failure of a positive right those children should have enjoyed to
citizenship-creation through developmental equality, a right that
would prepare them to vote. On the one hand, this Article argues
that a positive right to developmental justice might be pressed as a
precondition to a functioning democracy, as Jefferson believed
publicly financed education was such a precondition because children
and youth must be readied to vote.
That positive right to
developmental justice might be secured through their exercise of the
franchise. Yet the system of developmental injustice strips many of
them of the franchise before they reach adulthood, stripping them of
the very rationale for the developmental justice of which they were
deprived.
Debating extension of the franchise to 16-year-olds, where their
prototype is advantaged in development — whether imagined in
neuroscience studies or media accounts of Parkland activists —
highlights the distance between advantaged and disadvantaged
children. One may be offered the right to vote based on a narrative
of effectively nurtured cognitive development; the other develops a
criminal justice record before reaching the age of adulthood that is
likely to lead to long-term disenfranchisement.
Disenfranchisement is where the rubber meets the road for Dowd’s
theory — where a potential political theory justifying positive rights
in order to prepare children to become citizens is derailed by a
practical disqualification from citizenship before reaching the age of
majority for African American children. This is the Escher staircase
of positive rights to development, granted in order to create citizens
who govern the state allocation of resources that then impair
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development of too many African American youth and set them up
for long-term disenfranchisement. This Article seeks to translate
Dowd’s theory of developmental inequality into a question of politics
with the conundrum of popular sovereignty at its center.
CONCLUSION
I am impressed by the maturity and efficacy of youth political
activism, and believe we are living in a remarkable and hopeful era of
resurgent youth engagement. Broadly speaking, I believe youth have
the maturity and the stake to participate in elections. But elevating
the teen political voice by giving it the formal power of the franchise
poses a risk to the protective commitment we make toward teenagers,
a commitment already riddled with holes.
Even in
disenfranchisement, there is protection from entirely unfiltered
political and commercial speech. Child welfare advocates fight to
remind courts, educators, and police that 16-and 17-year-olds are
children. I am ambivalent about lowering the voting age to 16 in a
world where we are not protecting the franchise for people whose
involvement with the criminal justice system begins as minors and
strips them of the franchise. The contrast is too dizzying. Voting
activists seek both a youth franchise and the end to felony
disenfranchisement. Yet I listen to the de-contextualized deployment
of neuroscience and fear that felony disenfranchisement will take a
back seat to the broader power base seeking a 16-year-old franchise.
Moreover, the enfranchisement of 16-year-olds, where many
disadvantaged 16-year-olds are being primed to lose their franchise,
bumps up against the political force implicit in Dowd’s argument for
developmental equality. In Dowd’s words, “[a]s youth develop, they
are creating an identity that is either reinforced and supported, or
not.”134 The cultivation and reinforcement of participatory identity
for some, but not others, undermines the structure of rights as we
understand them. Through the developmental lens, the Escher
staircase that is the expansion of youth voting rights and its long-term
contraction comes to seem as unstable as an Escher drawing itself.

134. DOWD, supra note 22, at 67.

